MILITARIZATION AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES

UN
WOMEN

RESEARCH PAPER MILITARIZATION AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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1.1

OVERVIEW

Militarization often precipitates violent armed conflict but may also continue well after a conflict has ended. Heightened militarized processes in response to internal and external perceived threats entrench gender roles and enhance gender hierarchies. Militarization often shifts resources away from policy areas such as education and health that are especially important to girls and women. As a result, female empowerment is impeded or recedes when both society and policy focus on a militarized path. Some post-conflict countries see improved female empowerment after the end of conflict. However, emerging threats might lead to militarization, which could undermine the initial gender empowerment gains post-conflict.

This research paper examines under what circumstances post-conflict societies can avoid renewed militarization and potentially increase female empowerment and posits that the presence of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs) can allow for decreased military spending due to its ability to mitigate violence in both conflict and post-conflict situations. It is expected that states with a UN presence should be more easily able to reduce their militarization levels than civil conflict states without UN peacekeeping. It is further posited that peacekeeping should facilitate a policy shift that allows for greater female empowerment. In short, peacekeeping should both indirectly increase empowerment by decreasing militarization levels and directly by leading to decreased violence and higher levels of political and social stability.

1.1.1

Theoretical background

The base theoretical argument is summarized in Figures 1 & 2: Figure 1 illustrates the expectation that civil wars lead to higher levels of militarization that reduce female empowerment during the active conflict and several years after the conflict has ended. Figure 2 depicts the expectations that UN PKO presence has a direct positive impact on improving female empowerment. It is also anticipated that peacekeeping will reduce militarization and indirectly improve levels of female empowerment in a post-conflict country.

Empirical Hypothesis 1: During and after civil war, increased militarization is associated with lower female empowerment.

Empirical Hypothesis 2: During and after civil war, UN PKOs mitigate levels of militarization leading to improved female empowerment.

FIGURE 1

FIGURE 2

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

While there are many indications that UN peacekeeping improves outcomes for women and children during conflict, this research project examines how peacekeeping efforts may improve outcomes for women after conflict periods.

With the end of the cold war, UN peacekeeping began to pivot decidedly towards a focus on civil wars. Furthermore, the development of "robust" UN peacekeeping and a steadily increasing focus on human rights and humanitarian intervention has allowed UN peacekeeping to play a transformational role in conflict and post-conflict societies. This analysis includes all civil conflicts from 1990-2017 with at least a five-year peace period.

Two separate post-conflict peace situations in estimating the effects of UN peacekeeping on militarization and female empowerment are considered. First, the immediate period of peace, where all 24 states with available data have experienced at least five years with less than 25 deaths from all civil conflicts. Then the focus shifts to a more consolidated peace, extending to at least 7-10 years post-conflict. In essence, the analyses compare the impact of peacekeeping on female empowerment in the immediate post-conflict period to an extended, more established peaceful environment.

The multivariate estimations examine whether UN peacekeeping presence, by moderating military spending as a proportion of GDP, impacts female empowerment (as operationalized through V-Dem's 'Women Political Empowerment Index'). The findings suggest that UN peacekeeping is associated with lower levels of militarization both before and after civil war and that female empowerment is likewise significantly improved by the presence of UN peacekeeping operations. It is theorized that the UN has both direct and indirect effects on empowerment. To better understand if and to which extent UN presence has an impact on gender empowerment by creating the opportunity for governments to reduce military expenditures, series of multivariate mediation analyses are used. This nuanced examination of the direct and mediated effects of UN peacekeeping on female empowerment indicates that female empowerment levels rise after conflict in the presence of peacekeeping missions and, to a lesser extent, UN presence significantly mitigates the impact of military spending on female empowerment.

3.1.

KEY FINDINGS

The findings suggest that, as expected, there is a significant empirical, interactive relationship between UN peacekeeping, militarization and female empowerment.

3.1.1.

All Conflicts with a 5-Year & 10-Year Peace Period from 1990-2017

UN peacekeeping is associated with a positive increase in post-conflict female empowerment levels as compared to empowerment levels during conflict. The states that experienced the largest improvements in female empowerment after conflict had ended, were those that had received peacekeeping operations. Substantively, UN peacekeeping is associated with, on average, a 6 per cent increase in female empowerment levels in the 10 years after conflict.

Any societal push towards female empowerment in a post-conflict environment, however, may be dampened by high levels of militarization and government spending on the military. Indeed, the percentage of military spending as a proportion of GDP has a significant, negative correlation with female empowerment. Estimations of the direct and mediated effects of UN peacekeeping on female empowerment, suggest that female empowerment levels improve after conflict when the conflict states receive peacekeeping missions.

3.1.2.

Mediated Effects of UN Peacekeeping on Female Empowerment

Figures 3 and 4 summarize the key findings when the mediated effects of UN peacekeeping on female empowerment and military expenditures for 14 post-conflict countries are analyzed (N=114 and N=131, for a country and year list see the methodological appendix).[1] In practical terms, this means that UN presence, on average, leads to a 4 to 6 per cent increase in empowerment. The maximum recorded amount of female empowerment change from conflict to post-conflict periods is a 36 per cent increase. Most of this effect is a direct effect, however, approximately 15 per cent of the UN's effect on improving female empowerment is obtained through its impact in decreasing post-conflict militarized spending levels.

An example of these relationships is Liberia. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has played an important role in supporting the Liberian government after the end of the war in 2005 until the successful completion of its mandate in 2018. As a result, the Liberian government has maintained lower levels of military expenditures as a ratio of GDP and has recorded higher levels of female empowerment compared to much wealthier countries. Unfortunately, there is no data on military spending levels (SIPRI) for Liberia during conflict years. However, Sierra Leone, which is included in the estimation results, provides another example of how UN peacekeeping may negatively affect militarization levels and both directly and indirectly impact female empowerment. In the case of Sierra Leone, during the first five years of post-conflict peace, female empowerment increases 33 per cent and militarization levels drop 32 per cent while there is no change in the relatively low democracy levels suggesting that UN peacekeeping may have allowed the state the space to divert productive resources even in the absence of democratic institutional improvement. There is also evidence that every single country that did not record increases in female empowerment within 10 years from the termination of the conflict also did not have a UN peacekeeping mission.

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[1] Figures 3 and 4: Mediation Analysis of UN peacekeeping on changes to female empowerment. **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10 (one-tailed tests). 95 per cent confidence intervals in brackets. UN effects on Female Empowerment outside of triangle. Direction of variable relationships inside. Full results are reported in the Methodological Appendix.

FIGURE 3

The Impact of UN Peacekeeping on pre- to post-conflict changes in female empowerment (immediate post-conflict peace).


FIGURE 4

The Impact of UN Peacekeeping on pre- to post-conflict changes in female empowerment (immediate post-conflict peace).

3.1.3.

Mediated Effects of Democracy on Female Empowerment.

In our analysis we also looked at alternative mechanisms that can mitigate military spending as a percentage of GDP while improving female empowerment in the post-conflict period.

The mediated effect of democracy on female empowerment levels (see Figure 5) is examined.2 Democracy provides an additional positive pathway to female empowerment, at least within the consolidated post-conflict period. Democracy has a significant, positive impact on changes in female empowerment post-conflict, but there is no statistically significant mediated effect of democracy on empowerment through military spending, as there is with UN peacekeeping. Furthermore, democracy has no significant direct impact on female empowerment nor any significant impact on militarization in the immediate (5 year) post-conflict period. In short, while democracy provides the institutional structure to raise female empowerment levels relatively to the conflict period in states that have experienced at least 7-10-years of post-conflict peace, democratic institutions may not independently be able to provide for a peace environment that leads to significant decrease in military spending.

Additional robustness checks also controlled for the time following the passage of UNSC Resolution 1325 mandating the protection of women and children in UN operations. The inclusion of a dummy variable for the post-2000 period has no significant impact on our main UN peacekeeping variables in either the immediate or consolidated periods. The UNSCR 1325 dummy variable had a positive, and statistically significant effect on improving female empowerment in the consolidated post-conflict period but no significant effect in the immediate post-conflict period.

Figure 5: The Impact of Democracy on pre- to post-conflict changes in Female Empowerment (consolidated post-conflict peace).

Figure 5: Mediation Analysis of Democracy on changes to female empowerment. **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10 (one-tailed tests). 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Democracy on Female Empowerment outside of triangle. Direction of variable relationships inside. Full results are reported in the in the Methodological Appendix. Note, democracy has no significant effects on female empowerment for the immediate post-conflict peace period.

[2] Figure 5: Mediation Analysis of Democracy on changes to female empowerment. **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10 (one-tailed tests). 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Democracy on Female Empowerment outside of triangle. Direction of variable relationships inside. Full results are reported in the Methodological Appendix. Note, democracy has no significant effects on female empowerment for the immediate post-conflict peace period.

4.1.

SUMMARY

The results indicate that post-conflict states that have experienced UN peacekeeping are more likely to see decreased militarization levels and increased female empowerment than those states that have not benefited from UN peacekeeping

The impact of peacekeeping on female empowerment has two significant empirical pathways in our analyses, the first is direct—where peacekeeping significantly increases empowerment levels. The second of these is indirect—where peacekeeping significantly decreases the post-conflict military spending levels that significantly dampen female empowerment. These effects are even stronger for states that establish a consolidated longer-term peace. It is important to note that the positive impact of UN peacekeeping on female empowerment, and its negative impact on militarization, is established above and beyond the impacts of institutional democracy and are significant even when controlling for a post-UNSCR 1325 period.

In addition, it is important to note that, given that gender empowerment is a slow-moving process from year to year, an impact of 6 per cent over a period of 10 years can drive significant long-term trends. In summary, the analyses suggest that UN peacekeeping is associated with both increases in female empowerment levels and decreases in militarization in post-civil war conflict states.

TECHNICAL NOTES & APPENDIX

Measuring Key Variables

Female Empowerment: The yearly difference in post-conflict levels of female empowerment from the average levels of female empowerment during the conflict is used. The data are based on the variable female empowerment in the V-DEM project: "Women's political empowerment is defined as a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. It is understood to incorporate three equally-weighted dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions." Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1); Citation: Sundström et al. (2015, V-Dem Working Paper Series 2015:19); V-DEM varieties of Democracy, Codebook 11.1, March 2021 © University of Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute.

Militarization: Military expenditures by country as percentage of gross domestic product, 1949-2020 © SIPRI 2021.

UN Peacekeeping Presence: Dummy variable that takes value of 1 for UN Peacekeeping Presence and 0 if no UN Presence. The data code whether the PKO is present only during conflict, both during and after conflict periods, or only during the post-conflict period. (Benson and Tucker, forthcoming).

Control variables: Democracy Dummy variable where 1 = Democracy: 6 or greater on the Polity Scale, 0 = Non Democracy: below 6 on the Polity Scale (using Polity Project data); GDP per capita & Population data (using data by KS Gleditsch); Military Spending as a roportion of GDP and Average Military Spending during conflict (estimated using SIPRI data); Infant Mortality Rate (using World Bank data); Years since conflict began & average duration of conflict episode (estimated using Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data on conflicts); lag of female empowerment (using V-DEM project).

Coding Decisions in selecting cases (countries)

For Conflict Periods: At least 3 years of conflict OR at least 2 years of intense conflict (cumulative intensity=1) within a 10-year period. Active conflict period can range from 2-10 years.

Only active conflict years are included in the conflict period. Therefore, there may be less than 10 observations within the 10-year period (e.g., 1990, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999 – no 1992 and 1993 if those years were not active conflict years (as coded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP).

Post-Conflict Periods: in 5 and 7-10-year periods. No smaller increments within these periods. Post conflict period coded to 2017 (as determined by V-Dem time limitations).

When there were multiple conflict years for a state, the most-intense conflict according to the conflict-intensity variables by UCDP was chosen.

List of Post-Conflict States and Post-Conflict Years with Complete Data

Angola: 2010-2014
Azerbaijan: 1999-2003 and1999-2008
Bangladesh: 1992-1996 and 1992-2001
Burundi: 2012-2013
Cambodia (Kampuchea): 1999-2003 and 1999-2008
Congo: 2003-2007 and 2003-2008, 2010
Croatia: 1996-2000 and 1996-2005
Djibouti: 2000, 2004
Egypt: 1999-2003 and 1999-2008
El Salvador: 1992-1996 and 1992-2001
Guatemala: 1996-2000 and 1996-2005
Indonesia: 2006-2010 and 2006-2014
Ivory Coast: 2005-2009
Mozambique: 1993-1997, 1993-2002
Nepal: 2007-2011 and 2007-2014
Niger: 1998-2002
Papua New Guinea: 1997-2001 and 1997-2006
Peru: 2011-2015 and 2011-2014
Rwanda: 2003-2007
Senegal: 2004-2008,
Serbia (Yugoslavia): 2000-2004 and 2000-2006
Sierra Leone: 2002-2006, 2002-2011
Sri Lanka: 2010-2014
Tajikistan 2001-2004

Peaceful post-conflict states not included in analyses due to missing data

Bosnia-Herzegovina: 1996-2005
Eritrea: 2004-2013
Liberia: 2004-2013
Uzbekistan: 2005-2014

Mediation Analysis (UN) for Immediate Post-Conflict Peace (Figure 3)

TABLE 1A:

Regression on military spending as proportion of GDP

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t
UN PKO presence	-.284	.170	-1.67	0.097
Democracy	-.166	.192	-0.87	0.389
Average military spending conflict	.597	.061	9.80	0.000
Lag GDP	<.0001	<.0001	2.06	0.042
Years since onset	<-.001	<.001	-0.83	0.406
Max years conflict duration	-.017	.034	-0.51	0.609
Constant	.585	.314	1.86	0.065

Number of observations = 114

$F(6, 107) = 46.81$; Prob > F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.7241; Adj. R-squared = 0.7087; Root MSE = .78629

TABLE 1B:

Regression on change in female empowerment

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t
UN PKO presence	.0385925	.0150153	2.57	0.012
Average military spending conflict	-.0108349	.0056303	-1.92	0.057
Democracy	.0145736	.0182807	0.80	0.427
Lag of IMR	.0001475	.0002288	0.64	0.521
Lag of female empowerment (V-DEM)	.1410083	.0581238	2.43	0.017
Ln Population	-.0264463	.0070521	-3.75	0.000
Constant	.2294733	.0706262	3.25	0.002

Number of observations = 114

$F(6, 107) = 5.87$; Prob > F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.2478; Adj R-squared = 0.2056; Root MSE = .07319

Effect	Mean	[95% Conf. Interval]
ACME	.003	-.0009015, .0081124
Direct Effect	.039	.0099698, .0642349
Total Effect	.042	.0138881, .0641768
% of Total Effect Mediated	.065	.0425041, .1964107

Mediation Analysis (UN) for Consolidated Post-Conflict Peace (Figure 4)

TABLE 2A:

Regression on military spending as proportion of GDP

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t
Democracy	-.190	.228	-0.83	0.406
UN PKO presence	-.563	.217	-2.59	0.011
Average military spending conflict	.411	.080	5.15	0.000
Lag GDP	<.0001	<.0001	0.51	0.609
Years since onset	-.021	.008	-2.66	0.009
Max years conflict duration	.042	.038	1.08	0.280
Constant	1.185	.350	3.39	0.001

Number of obs = 131

F(6, 124) = 20.58; Prob > F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.4989; Adj R-squared = 0.4747; Root MSE =.96757

TABLE 2B:

Regression on change in female empowerment

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t
Democracy	.108	.016	6.78	0.000
Militarization	-.018	.005	-3.68	0.000
UN PKO presence	.054	013	4.08	0.000
Lag of IMR	<.001	<.001	3.63	0.000
Lag of female empowerment (V-DEM)	.082	.053	1.55	0.123
Ln Population	-.039	.005	-8.71	0.000
Constant	.339	.049	6.89	0.000

Number of observations = 131

F(6, 124) = 43.08; Prob > F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.6758; Adj R-squared = 0.6601; Root MSE = .0612

Effect	Mean	[95% Conf. Interval]
ACME	.001	-.0029979, .0196298
Direct Effect	.054	.0288429, .0766692
Total Effect	.063	.0452917, .0796671
% of Total Effect Mediated	.155	.1239359, .2180003

Mediation Analysis (Democ) for Consolidated Post-Conflict Peace (Figure 5)

TABLE 3A:

Regression on militarization per capita

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t
Democracy	-.190	.228	-0.83	0.406
UN PKO presence	-.563	.217	-2.59	0.011
Average military spending conflict	.411	.080	5.15	0.000
Lag GDP	<.0001	<.0001	0.51	0.609
Years since onset	-.021	.008	-2.66	0.009
Max years conflict duration	.042	.038	1.08	0.280
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Effect	Mean	[95% Conf. Interval]
ACME	.004	-.0026714, .0132725
Direct Effect	.107	.0772803, .1344379
Total Effect	.111	.0905264, .1320674
% of Total Effect Mediated	.035	.0296196, .0432116

Fixed Effects Results (Dependent variable is mortality)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5 (Low)	Model 6 (Middle)	Model 7 (High)	Model 8 (Islamic)	Model 9 (MENA)
GMI	0.618**	0.611**	0.615**	0.621**	0.981*	0.054	0.033***	0.231	0.269**
	(0.277)	(0.278)	(0.278)	(0.278)	(0.551)	(0.074)	(0.009)	(0.244)	(0.096)
GDP per capita	-0.478	-0.315	-0.469	-0.575	-39.31***	-4.339***	-0.082**	-1.666	-0.586**
	(0.655)	(0.637)	(0.648)	(0.657)	(11.723)	(1.155)	(0.039)	(1.095)	(0.251)
conflict	16.680	16.919	16.861	16.659	22.322	-0.351	0.735	19.082	-15.294
	(20.022)	(20.013)	(20.006)	(20.019)	(23.805)	(1.909)	(0.494)	(33.936)	(10.431)
polity2	-6.896**	-6.999**	-7.004**	-6.908**	-7.321**	-1.929	0.172	-8.320	-0.809
	(2.879)	(2.875)	(2.876)	(2.880)	(3.619)	(1.872)	(0.376)	(5.157)	(0.965)
low income		18.554*							
		(10.242)							
middle income			-16.342**						
			(7.668)						
high income				11.851					
				(7.315)					
R-sq	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.12	0.17	0.27	0.05	0.26
Obs.	2330	2330	2330	2330	1181	502	647	590	277

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

Fixed Effects Results (Dependent variable is GDI)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5 (Low)	Model 6 (Middle)	Model 7 (High)	Model 8 (Islamic)	Model 9 (MENA)
GMI	-0.0002**	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001	-0.0001*	-0.0002***	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
GDP per capita	0.001*	0.0007*	0.0008**	0.0008*	0.021***	0.004***	0.0001	0.005**	0.003
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
externalconf	-0.002	-0.0014	-0.0016	-0.0017	0.0002	-0.002	0.002*	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.002)	(0.0021)	(0.002)	(0.0021)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.005)
polity2	0.0012	0.0013	0.0013	0.0012*	0.002	-0.001	0.006***	0.002	0.001
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
low income		-0.015**							
		(0.005)							
middle income			0.009*						
			(0.004)						
high income				0.0023					
				(0.005)					
R-sq	0.10	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.22	0.39	0.58	0.28	0.07
Obs.	1361	1361	1361	1361	569	366	906	426	193

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

Fixed Effect IV-2SLS Results (Dependent variable is labourforce)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GMI	-0.0072***	0.0071**	-0.0103	-0.0140***
	(0.0026)	(0.0029)	(0.0103)	(0.0028)
GDP per capita	0.3060***	0.4538***	0.3063***	0.3321***
	(0.0192)	(0.0230)	(0.0192)	(0.0194)
externalconf	-0.0777	-0.0389	-0.1311	-0.1168
	(0.0759)	(0.0745)	(0.1824)	(0.0755)
polity2	-0.0729**	-0.0365	-0.0726**	-0.3743***
	(0.0333)	(0.0329)	(0.0333)	(0.0576)
GMIGDPcapita		-1.1651**		
		(0.1047)		
GMIexternalconf			0.0003	
			(0.0009)	
GMIpolity2				0.0021***
				(0.0003)
Obs.	3158	3158	3158	3158

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

Fixed Effect IV-2SLS Results (Dependent variable is womenseat)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GMI	-0.097***	-0.093***	-0.190***	-0.107***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.007)
GDP per capita	0.277***	0.308***	0.271***	0.304***
	(0.044)	(0.059)	(0.044)	(0.045)
externalconf	-1.403***	-1.403***	-3.022***	-1.421***
	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.437)	(0.192)
polity2	0.399***	0.403***	0.401***	-0.021
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.158)
GMIGDPcapita		-0.177**		
		(0.223)		
GMIexternalconf			0.009***	
			(0.002)	
GMIpolity2				0.003***
				(0.001)
Obs.	2454	2454	2454	2454

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

Fixed Effect IV-2SLS Results (Dependent variable is fertility)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GMI	0.134***	0.149***	0.181***	0.133***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.030)	(0.008)
GDP per capita	-0.135**	0.024	-0.139**	-0.132**
	(0.057)	(0.069)	(0.056)	(0.057)
externalconf	-0.276	-0.234	0.522	-0.279
	(0.223)	(0.222)	(0.536)	(0.224)
polity2	-0.897***	-0.858***	-0.902***	-0.923***
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.171)
GMIGDPcapita		-1.251***		
		(0.313)		
GMIexternalconf			-0.005	
			(0.003)	
GMIpolity2				0.0002
				(0.0009)
Obs.	3158	3158	3158	3158

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

Fixed Effect IV-2SLS Results (Dependent variable is mortality)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GMI	0.577***	0.801***	2.323***	0.484***
	(0.084)	(0.103)	(0.351)	(0.091)
GDP per capita	-0.468	2.056**	-0.219	-0.141
	(0.674)	(0.948)	(0.670)	(0.684)
externalconf	0.868	0.985	32.521***	0.853
	(2.889)	(2.880)	(6.588)	(2.887)
polity2	-9.371***	-9.011***	-9.431***	-15.013***
	(1.174)	(1.175)	(1.163)	(2.335)
GMIGDPcapita		-12.001***		
		(3.079)		
GMIexternalconf			-0.174***	
			(0.034)	
GMIpolity2				0.032***
				(0.011)
Obs.	2146	2146	2146	2146

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

Fixed Effect IV-2SLS Results (Dependent variable is GDI)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GMI	-0.0002***	-0.0003***	-0.0005***	-0.0002***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)
GDP per capita	0.0005**	0.0002	0.0005**	0.0005**
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
externalconf	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.009***	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
polity2	0.0017***	0.0017***	0.0017***	0.002***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0007)
GMIGDPcapita		0.003**		
		(0.001)		
GMIexternalconf			0.00003***	
			(0.0000)	
GMIpolity2				-0.00002
				(0.00003)
Obs.	1353	1353	1353	1353

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

Fixed Effect IV-2SLS Results (Dependent variable is GII, with milex)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
milex	0.032***	0.080***	0.015	0.031***
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.002)
GDP per capita	-0.003***	-0.001*	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
externalconf	0.010***	0.014***	0.006**	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
polity2	-0.005***	-0.004***	-0.005***	-0.006***
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GMIGDPcapita		-0.001***		
		(0.0001)		
GMIexternalconf			0.002*	
			(0.001)	
GMIpolity2				0.005**
				(0.0002)
Obs.	2813	2813	2813	2813

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

Fixed Effect IV-2SLS Results (Dependent variable is GII, with milinpol)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
milinpol	-0.005**	-0.010***	-0.019**	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.002)
GDP per capita	-0.004***	-0.008***	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
externalconf	0.007***	0.007***	0.002	0.007**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
polity2	-0.006***	-0.005***	-0.006***	-0.004***
	(0.0006)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
milinpolGDPcapita		0.0007***		
		(0.0002)		
milinpolexternalconf			0.001*	
			(0.001)	
milinpolity2				-0.0006**
				(0.0003)
Obs.	2983	2983	2983	2983

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

TABLE 4A:

System Estimations (with milex)

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | |
	GII	milex	GII	milex	women seats
milex	0.089***		0.078***		
	(0.002)		(0.00003)		
GDP per capita	-0.005***		-0.005***		
	(0.0001)		(0.0001)		
military in politics		-0.038**		-0.018	
		(0.015)		(0.470)	
conflict		0.602***		0.671***	
		(0.056)		(0.060)	
women seats		-0.031***		-0.186***	
		(0.002)		(0.002)	
polity2	0.089***	-0.089***			0.633***
	(0.002)	(0.004)			(0.021)
Obs.	2231	2231	2231	2231	2231
Time Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

TABLE 4B:

System Estimations (with labourforce)

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | |
	labourforce	GMI	labourforce	GMI	women seats
GMI	-0.107***		-0.080***		
	(0.004)		(0.003)		
GDP per capita	0.057***		0.019		
	(0.014)		(0.013)		
military in politics		17.846***		18.022***	
		(1.032)		(1.030)	
conflict		43.528***		43.231***	
		(4.045)		(4.166)	
women seats		-1.595***		-10.197***	
		(0.143)		(0.144)	
polity2		-5.046***			0.623***
		(0.264)			(0.023)
Obs.	2378	2378	2378	2378	2378
Time Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

TABLE 4C:

System Estimations (with GDI)

	Model 1		Model 2		
	GDI	GMI	GDI	GMI	women seats
GMI	-0.0008***		-0.0007***		
	(0.0000)		(0.0000)		
GDP per capita	0.0006***		0.0007***		
	(0.0000)		(0.0000)		
military in politics		3.898***		4.296***	
		(1.122)		(1.124)	
conflict		37.491***		38.225***	
		(4.073)		(4.167)	
women seats		-0.947***		-8.984***	
		(0.140)		(0.143)	
polity2		-4.552***			0.586***
		(0.281)			(0.029)
Obs.	1199	1199	1199	1199	1199
Time Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

TABLE 4D:

System Estimations (alternative model)

	GII	Military in Politics	GMI	women seats
military in politics	-0.1220***			
	(0.0016)			
GMI		-0.0233***		
		(0.0003)		
women seats			-8.2835***	
			(0.0661)	
polity2				0.5846***
				(0.0165)
Obs.	2369	2369	2369	2369

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.

TABLE 5:

Pooled OLS Estimation Results (Dependent variable is SIGI)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7 (Low)	Model 8 (Middle)	Model 9 (High)	Model 10 (Islamic)	Model 11 (MENA)
Milex	1.186*	1.964**	1.304*	1.529**	1.040*	1.261*	3.345**	-1.121	2.343**	2.317*	2.697
	[0.453]	[0.442]	[0.510]	[0.357]	[0.355]	[0.458]	[0.992]	[0.487]	[0.427]	[0.943]	[1.967]
GDPcap	-2.885**	-1.577	-3.097***	-1.578	-3.052**	-3.606***	-11.307	2.859	-1.149	-3.822	-0.575
	[0.586]	[1.044]	[0.508]	[0.786]	[0.607]	[0.602]	[7.291]	[7.983]	[1.017]	[2.682]	[2.133]
Conflict	0.039**	0.037**	0.038**	0.039**	0.046**	0.055**	0.012	0.101	0.011	0.091*	0.052
	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.010]	[0.014]	[0.012]	[0.031]	[0.051]	[0.008]	[0.032]	[0.043]
Democ	-0.009***	-0.006**	-0.009***	-0.008***			0.001	-0.018*	-0.009***		
	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]			[0.002]	[0.006]	[0.000]		
Low		0.093**									
		[0.016]									
Middle			-0.037								
			[0.017]								
High				-0.066***							
				[0.008]							
Islamic					0.097***						
					[0.011]						
Mena						0.079*					
						[0.034]					
2012	0.123***	0.127***	0.123***	0.127***	0.118***	0.121***	0.115***	0.142***	0.125***	0.093**	0.071
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.017]	[0.033]
2014	0.079***	0.081***	0.076***	0.085***	0.067***	0.066***	0.082***	0.124***	0.060***	0.069***	0.040*
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.010]	[0.015]
2019	0.227***	0.226***	0.225***	0.229***	0.212***	0.209***	0.230***	0.296***	0.202***	0.204***	0.296***
	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.004]	[0.020]
Obs.	354	354	354	354	371	371	130	58	166	103	27

Standard errors in brackets. Significance denoted by *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.

Pooled mean group ARDL Estimation Results (Dependent variable is labourforce)

	Model 1 Whole Set		Model 2 High Income		Model 3 Non-High Income		Model 4 Parliament	
	GMI	Milex	GMI	Milex	GMI	Milex	GMI	Milex
Long-run Coefficients								
Militarization	-0.028***	-0.004	-0.074	-0.164***	-0.206***	-0.009*	-0.047*	-0.577***
	[0.008]	[0.003]	[0.246]	[0.016]	[0.032]	[0.004]	[0.025]	[0.097]
GDPcap	0.123***	0.005	0.557	0.316***	-0.125***	-0.196***	0.124***	0.651***
	[0.020]	[0.017]	[0.652]	[0.026]	[0.007]	[0.018]	[0.032]	[0.092]
FLFPglobal	1.239***	1.734***	4.795	-0.545	-0.221	1.877***	0.688***	-3.560***
	[0.267]	[0.230]	[3.142]	[0.451]	[0.297]	[0.342]	[0.177]	[0.682]
Time trend	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.027	-0.002	0.005***	-0.003*	0.0009	Omitted
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.024]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	
Short-run Coefficients								
Error Correction Coefficient	-0.115***	-0.109***	-0.451***	-0.113***	-0.106***	-0.120***	-0.136***	-0.045***
	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.040]	[0.021]	[0.023]	[0.025]	[0.032]	[0.014]
ΔMilitarization	0.097*	0.002	0.144**	0.023***	0.123	-0.001	0.267	0.025***
	[0.054]	[0.004]	[0.055]	[0.007]	[0.088]	[0.006]	[0.234]	[0.008]
ΔGDPcap	-0.018	-0.003	-0.002	0.016	-0.027	-0.027	0.102	0.100
	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.051]	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.030]	[0.076]	[0.078]
ΔFLFPglobal	0.794***	0.770***	0.547*	0.762***	0.811***	0.649**	0.716***	0.767***
	[0.212]	[0.222]	[0.309]	[0.256]	[0.302]	[0.301]	[0.185]	[0.189]
Intercept	-0.214***	-0.311***	0.934	0.239***	0.754***	-0.201***	0.051**	0.409***
	[0.032]	[0.044]	[1.393]	[0.044]	[0.161]	[0.044]	[0.025]	[0.189]
No. Countries	74	74	30	30	44	44	33	33
Obs.	1998	1964	810	810	1188	1154	785	785

Standard errors in brackets. Significance denoted by *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.

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